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THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REFORM.

Court reform involves much more than the modernization of outdated
practices of judicial administration. By changing the organization and procedures of courts, court reform redistributes power within the court system
and the larger community. The eleven essays in The Politics ofJudicial Reform explore some of the ways that reform proposals create political conflicts among competing groups and interests and in tum shape the outcome
of reform proposals.
Although earlier commentators have recognized the political significance of judicial reform, the literature on the subject is sparse.I The Politics
ofJudicial Reform does not attempt to present a comprehensive survey, for
as editor Philip L. Dubois notes, no single book could hope to treat comprehensively a topic as broad as the politics ofjudicial reform (p. 11). By highlighting some of the political rainifi.cations of reform, however, Dubois
illustrates the breadth of the subject and demonstrates the importance of its
continued study.
The essays begin with an introduction to some of the basic political
dimensions of court reform. Henry R. Glick emphasizes the role political
parties play in court reform. Since state-level reforms generally "shift judicial administration from local control and independence to centralized
court management" (p. 17), groups with vested interest in locally managed
courts often oppose the reforms. According to Glick, these groups include
local judges and court employees; the Democratic Party, which has a strong
influence on judicial elections in its urban strongholds; and general-practice
and trial lawyers, who are accustomed to existing structures and who are
usually Democrats (pp. 23-25). The proponents of reform often include bar
associations,2 the federal government, middle class civic organizations, the
Republican Party,3 and "high-status" lawyers, who are often bar activists
and Republican partisans (pp. 20-23). Although proponents have achieved
recent successes in streamlining and consolidating the courts, Glick observes that state court systems remain highly decentralized.4
Glick probably overstates the partisan aspect of court reform. First, Republican advocacy of court reform may be limited to cities, where the party
lacks power. As Glick notes, legislative opponents of court reform "come
1. Geoff Gallas has observed the political aspect of court reform and suggested that it
needs to be explored. See Gallas, Court Reform: Has it been Built on an Adequate Foundation?, 63 JUDICATURE 28, 37 (1979). For other works on the political aspects of judicial reform, see notes 13 & 14 infra.
2. Glick suggests that bar associations became involved in court reform to improve the
image and economic status of lawyers and the image of justice in general. One of their prime
concerns has been the elimination of partisan influence in the selection of judges in favor of
merit-based selection. P. 20.
3. Glick notes that Republican officials frequently oppose the link between judges and
local party politics in order to lessen Democratic influence in urban politics. P. 24-25.
4. For example, Glick notes that state courts remain largely dependent upon local government for funding. P. 27.

774

March 1983]

Politics of Judicial Reform

775

more often from rural areas where traditional values and local control are
more important" (p. 25). In states with large urban populations, the rural
or outstate legislators have come predominantly from the Republican
Party.5 Second, Glick presents no solid evidence linking general-practice
and trial lawyers with the Democratic Party. He notes only that these lawyers occupy lower rungs on the socioeconomic ladder than do "high-status"
lawyers (p. 24). If socioeconomic status is taken as a measure of partisanship, general-practice and trial lawyers may be less likely to be Republicans
than their "high-status" counterparts. Given the relatively high socioeconomic status of lawyers as a group, however, lower status lawyers do not
necessarily share a strong Democratic predisposition.
The essays in Part II examine court reform in a broader political context. Frank Munger argues that popular political upheavals have influenced the major court reform movements of this century (pp. 51-67). Court
reform, according to Munger, has been led historically by legal elites which
"carry out a self-appointed mandate to improve the court system" (p. 53).
Although these elites have sought to protect their own interests, they also
have attempted to restore legitimacy to threatened governmental institutions by strengthening the credibility of the legal system (pp. 61-62).6 During the Progressive Era, court reformers strove to assist those classes with
little political influence by attacking cumbersome procedures and poor administration of local courts (pp. 55-56). During the New Deal, realist legal
theory helped reformers rationalize the transfer of policy enforcement from
the courts to administrative tribunals as ensuring greater popular control
over government decisionmaking (pp. 57-59). Since the 1960's, court reformers have attempted to divert relatively unimportant cases from the
courts to accommodate the increasing number of cases involving important
political issues that other branches have not handled (pp. 59-61). Thus,
although court reform is commonly justified in terms of efficiency, the ideals of court reform have changed when differing demands have been placed
on the government and the courts (p. 62).7
Against this backdrop, Richard Gambitta and Marlynn May suggest
that reforms designed to increase access to the courts and reduce court congestion have combined to create popular dissatisfaction with the courts (pp.
69-83). Under these reforms, more people have contact with the judicial
system, but their disputes are often settled through informal negotiation
and reconciliation rather than formal adjudication. Gambitta and May ar5. See T. DYE, POLITICS IN STATES AND COMMUNITIES 104 (2d ed. 1973); V. KEY, AMERICAN STATE POLITICS 230-34 (1956).
6. Munger's analysis modifies the views of Lawrence Friedman, who sees judicial reform
solely as a self-serving activity undertaken by elites in the legal profession to maintain their
control within the profession and create a favorable public image. See Friedman, Law Reform
in Historical Perspective, 13 ST. Lours U. L.J. 351, 357-58 (1969). Munger argues that Friedman "does not devote sufficient attention to the continuous pressures on lawyers to maintain
compatibility between the legal system and other institutions in the society." P. 54.
7. During the Progressive era, efficiency, Munger suggests, meant greater access to governmental institutions. In the New Deal-Realist period, it meant doing away with normative
distinctions between judiciary and administration and accepting the bare fact of authority or
power. Recently, it has had a strong overtone of excluding unimportant, minor, and new
rights. P. 62.
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gue that courts derive legitimacy from popular acceptance of "the myth of
the triad" (p. 73). The elements of the triadic model are (1) a neutral judge
who resolves disputes by (2) applying preexisting rules to cases presented in
adversarial proceedings and (3) publicly explaining the reasons for the decision.8 Reforms, Gambitta and May conclude, are eroding the triad's acceptance and contributing to reported increases9 in popular dissatisfaction
(p. 79).
Gambitta and May, however, lack the necessary empirical evidence to
support their position. 10 Without such evidence, one could assert with
equal plausibility that informal methods of resolving disputes actually limit
popular disillusionment with the courts. Formal proceedings are often
costly and time-consuming. In spite of reforms aimed at reducing congestion, they also may be marked by long delays. Informal methods allow
parties to avoid these obstacles. Moreover, parties may be more satisfied
with a result to which they have agreed than with a court-imposed result.
Further empirical study seems necessary to determine the popular impact
of informal dispute resolution.
Following a collection of legislative and administrative case studies in
Parts III and IV, Larry Cohen attacks current "depoliticized" methods of
evaluating the competency of judges. These methods, Cohen argues, preclude public input, because they attempt to measure qualities, such as "legal
ability'' and ''.judicial temperament," that are "either unobserved by those
outside the legal process or simply inaccessible to the objective assessment"
(p. 170). Cohen asserts that "repoliticizing" the competence issue would
give the public a genuine role in evaluating the courts. Somewhat vaguely,
Cohen advocates repoliticization through surveying "lawyers, other court
actors, clients, interest-group representatives, and the various sectors of the
general public" (p. 173). Cohen concedes that a repoliticizing process will
be difficult to develop and operationalize, but he contends that methods can
be developed from current social science models (pp. 172-73).
Although consonant with current trends in the critical legal studies
movement, Cohen's proposal cuts against the grain of modem court reform.
To promote professionalism in the judiciary, reformers have sought the depoliticization (or "professionalization") that Cohen assails, largely through
efforts to abolish judicial elections. 11 Curiously, Cohen does not advocate
elections as a possible means of repoliticization, 12 and he fails to explain
8. The triadic model as an ideal legitimating the courts has been proposed by many scholars. See, e.g., T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (2d ed. 1962); Arnold, Law Enforcement - An Attempt at Social .Dissection, 42 YALE L.J. I (1932); Cavanagh & Sarat,
Thinking About Courts: Toward and Beyond a Jurisprudence ofJudicial Competence, 14 LAW &
SocY. REv. 371 (1980); Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353
(1978); Sarat, Supportfar the Legal System: An Analysis ofKnowledge, Attitudes and Behavior,
3 AM. POL. Q. 1 (1975).
9. See YANKELOVICH, SKELLY & WHITE, INC., THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF COURTS (1978).
10. Gambitta and May admit that an empirical study is necessary to validate their argument. P. 80.
11. Glick notes these efforts in his essay. Pp. 19-20.
12. Cohen's admitted aim is to "invigorate the political element in competence discussions
while retaining the admitted expertise of those particularly well suited to observe judicial behavior ..••" Pp. 171-72.
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why elections do not give the public sufficient input in those jurisdictions
that retain them. Yet even though he avoids this sensitive issue, leaders of
the bar are likely to view his proposal skeptically, as too great an intrusion
on judicial professionalism.
The Politics of Judicial Reform sketches a broad outline of its subject,
focusing on some of its aspects and leaving others unexplored. The essays,
while provocative, are at times speculative and lacking in depth. Dubois
suggests that interested readers should supplement this book with the few
other collections 13 and case studies 14 in the area (p. 11). Still, The Politics of
Judicial Reform offers a unique introduction to "aspects of judicial reform
[that] have been too long neglected by court-reform leaders and students of
the courts" (p. 2).

13. E.g., L. BERKSON, W. HAYS & S. CARBON, MANAGING THE STATE COURTS {1977); R.
WHEELER & H. WHITCOMB, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (1977). While somewhat more detailed than Dubois's collection, these works do not share its strong emphasis on the political
factors underlying judicial reform.
Dubois has edited another collection designed to complement this one. See P. DuBOIS,
THE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL REFORM (1982).
14. E.g., L. BERKSON & S. CARBON, COURT UNIFICATION: HISTORY, POLITICS AND IMPLEMENTATION (1978); P. FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
(1973). Berkson and Hays focus upon state court reform, presenting some detail on campaigns
to achieve court reform. Fish's work, as the title suggests, deals solely with federal reforms,
offering an historical survey beginning in the early days of the republic.

